

TO A PENSIONER:

If you draw under Act of June 27, 1900, and will soon reach age of 65, 68, or 70, write for a blank to The National Tribune, Washington, D. C.

ONE DOLLAR A YEAR.

War of the Rebellion

OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

By JOHN MCLEROY.

CHAPTER XXXV.

END OF THE SIEGE.

Another Blowing-Up of Fort Hill—Terrible Cannonade—Pemberton Calls a Council of War—Decision to Surrender—Meeting With Gen. Grant—Surrender—Insistence Upon Better Terms—Surrender at Last.

The result of the blowing up of Fort Hill, as McPherson's men called it, or of the "3d La. Redan," as the Confederates officially termed it, brought some cheer and exultation to the defenders, but not much confidence, while the temporary defeat really encouraged the Union soldiers. These had come so near succeeding that they were sanguine that the next time they could not fail. In spite of their repulse they had given up an inch of the ground which they had gained, and remained in possession of the crater of the destroyed fort, which before nightfall they had converted into a formidable work of their own, impregnable to a Confederate assault and an admirable base from which they could attack the defenders. As the fort was on the highest ground in the vicinity, from it there was a general slope to the river, it was evident that at the worst the enemy could not construct many more inner works, if any, because these

to throw a shell over the works was taken up by the Engineers and improved upon. It was found that sections of the tough sweet gum wood were best for this purpose, and they were still further reinforced by having three iron bands shrunk around them. These made very powerful pieces of artillery as long as they lasted, and would throw a six or 12-pound shell with great accuracy from 50 to 100 yards, and last about 100 rounds. Eventually the whole front was studded with these little mortars, which inflicted great loss upon the defenders. A number were set around the crater of Fort Hill, and assisted greatly in driving back the enemy from the new fort.

The enemy was no less active, and worked strenuously to prevent the advance of the saps. In spite of everything the sap-rollers would become dry and inflammable. The enemy would throw fire-balls of cotton saturated with camphene against the sap-rollers, and when one took fire the conflagration was aided by throwing hand grenades against it, and very frequently the roller burned up in spite of all that the soldiers could do, and exposed the head of the sap to the vicious fire of the enemy's infantry behind the works.

The Second Blowing Up.

By the night of June 30 the mines had been extended under the new fort; they were packed with about 2,250

Simultaneously with the explosion the enemy opened a terrific fire at short range from two eight-inch columbads, two 30-pounder Parrott guns, and one 12-pounder howitzer, and a mortar throwing 12-pound shells (afterward ascertained to be wooden mortars), concentrating their whole fire on this point. This mortar did us great damage, having exact range of the saps, and throwing shells heavily charged with powder. The force of this terrific explosion threw the officers and men of the 6th Mo. and a portion of the 3d La. back from the works over the brow of the hill, knocking off their hats and their guns out of their hands, bruising and wounding quite a number, but notwithstanding this, these gallant soldiers rallied, seized the nearest gun, and rushed back to the works. The veterans of the 3d La. raised a cheer, which was quickly taken up by our troops. Immediately after the explosion, I ordered up the 2d Mo., under Lieut.-Col. Senteny, to this point, and about 8 p. m. relieved the 6th Mo. with the 2d Mo. The fire from the enemy's batteries was kept up till after dark, and from the mortar during the entire night.

"This day the 5th Mo. lost eight killed and 48 wounded, and the 2d Mo. lost three killed and 35 wounded; many severely, who afterward died. "Among the killed of today is numbered one of the best officers in the Missouri army—Lieut.-Col. Pembroke S. Senteny, of the 2d Mo.—brave, cool and generous. A model soldier and officer; also Lieuts. Crenshaw and Rossberry, of the 6th Mo."

Engineering Difficulties.

All the running of saps and of mines and the estimation of distances had to be made under the greatest difficulties by the Engineers and others engaged in conducting the work. The sharp-shooting was so incessant and accurate that a finger could not be stuck up above protection, and any effort to secure a glimpse of the ground in front of

cautions against it by doubling his pickets, and sending his force of gunboats and lining the Louisiana shore opposite Vicksburg with piles of dry wood to be made into bonfires in case of such an attempt of the garrison.

The last communication between Pemberton and Johnston related to a joint operation, with Johnston striking at the Union army by the way of the Haynes's Bluff, and Pemberton taking advantage of this to escape with his army to the south and southeast by the Hankinson's and Baldwin's Ferry Roads. Johnston moved down toward Haynes's Bluff to carry out his part of the program, though it was hopeless from the first, since fully one-half of Grant's army was stationed there behind strong works. When Pemberton felt the pulse of his own army with the program, though it was hopeless from the first, since fully one-half of Grant's army was stationed there behind strong works. When Pemberton felt the pulse of his own army with the program, though it was hopeless from the first, since fully one-half of Grant's army was stationed there behind strong works.

On the 3d of March the following order was received by Gen. Gilbert from Murfreesboro: "The General commanding directs that you send a brigade and a sufficient cavalry force to-morrow on the Columbia pike as far as Spring Hill; send out a party to take the morning of the day after to-morrow on the Columbia pike, one through to Raleigh Springs on the Lewisburg pike. A cavalry force from here will communicate with your party at that place some time during the day after to-morrow. We desire to know what is in your front. Take a forage-train along. (Signed) J. A. Garfield, Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff."

THOMPSON'S STATION.

A Fine Brigade Sacrificed by a General's Mismanagement. Splendid Fighting Against Overwhelming Forces.

By CHAS. P. LINCOLN, Captain, 19th Mich.

I am to give my personal recollection of an engagement known as the fight at Thompson Station, or Spring Hill, Tenn., occurring March 5, 1863.

Early in February the corps commanded by Gen. Gordon Granger, three divisions, 12,000 strong, reached Nashville by steamers from Louisville. The First Division was commanded by that general and much-valued commander, Gen. Absalom Baird; the Second and Third by Gens. Gilbert and Crook. Granger's headquarters were at Nashville; Baird and Crook camped near there, and Gilbert at Franklin.

The Third Brigade of Gen. Baird's Division, commanded by Col. John Coburn, of Indiana, was temporarily assigned to Gilbert's command, and posted at Brentwood, midway between Nashville and Franklin.

The rebel forces, under command of Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn, consisting of four brigades of 15 regiments and four batteries of artillery with Gens. Forrest, Cosby, Armstrong, Martin and Col. Whitfield as commanders, crossed Duck River early in February, and soon after encamped near Thompson Station. Van Dorn's pickets, thrown well forward, came in frequent conflict with those of Gen. Gilbert in front of Franklin.

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Coburn's Brigade, 1,845 strong, consisted of his own regiment, 33d Ind., Lieut.-Col. Henderson, 15th Ind., Col. Baird; 22d Wis., Col. Utley; and 19th Mich., Col. Gilbert. Of the latter regiment the writer was a member. Detachments of the 4th Ky., 2d Mich. and 5th Pa. Cav., 600 strong, under command of Col. Jordan, of the last-mentioned regiment, together with the 15th Ind. Battery, Capt. Alsie, were added to the brigade, making the total strength 2,837 officers and men.

On the morning of the 4th of March, remembered well as a bright, cool day, the column moved out of Franklin, Ala., to every opportunity to secure forage for his animals. Gen. Gilbert sent 100 wagons under guard of the 124th Ohio, to the rear.

Simultaneously with our movement, Van Dorn made a reconnaissance toward Franklin, encountering our forces about four miles out; lines of battle were formed, the enemy occupying a range of hills crossing the turnpike at right angles. The face of the country hereabouts was much broken, undulating, presenting to the eye long swells and ridges, in many places quite steep and precipitous; thus the view of the country was circumscribed, except in the direction along the turnpike. Our guns, posted on a slight elevation, had

threw forward three regiments of infantry and a portion of his cavalry; as they advanced the rebels fell back, but soon appeared on the high hills in front of us to our left and right. Gen. Forrest appeared with a large force on the Lewisburg road to our left, and it was apparent to all that they greatly outnumbered us. The fields, the road, and the densely-wooded heights were swarming with their artillery. A messenger was dispatched by Col. Coburn to Gen. Gilbert giving full information as to the situation, and our advanced forces were ordered to fall back to our first position, where we remained fully three hours awaiting orders from the General at Franklin. The order came: "I suppose you understand the object of the move; if forage train is likely to prove an embarrassment, send it back and go ahead." The train was returned, and the rebels advanced in close column, and by far too near our heads to be enjoyable. We were in this position but a moment, when the rattle of musketry and the rebel yell away to our right assured us that our comrades of the 33d and 85th Ind. were desperately engaged.

These regiments had been ordered to move upon the station and to charge a battery at its left. Under cover of our two guns on the hill in their rear, although in the face of a heavy fire of musketry from the artillery, they moved steadily in column by division until near the depot, when they made a rush for the battery, the rebels rallying around it, and although Whitfield's Texas Brigade, under brigade command, ceased behind a stone fence, rose and poured a withering fire into the ranks of these gallant Hoosiers, they would not give up the battery. At this moment informed that a large force was passing to our left and rear by the Lewisburg pike. Convinced then beyond doubt that we were in the presence of an enemy outnumbering us by thousands, he ordered the Indiana regiments to fall back, intending to retreat. When these regiments began to retire, Jackson's Division, a position in the woods in the rear of the station charged upon them with loud yells, and pursued them across the valley, and over a stone fence, and on to the summit of the hill, and the Indians declined to retreat further, but turned upon and repulsed their assailants, driving them back over the same ground to the depot, behind which the discomfited enemy again rallied.

As we heard what proved to be Jackson's charge upon the Indiana boys, the gallant Major of the 19th Mich., W. R. Shafter, now Major-General, retired, at breakneck speed rode from our regiment over to the right and did effective and courageous service in rallying and encouraging our retreating troops, even joining them in their counter-charge.

As we were in column by division, close order, just below our battery, our position was deemed a dangerously exposed one in the event of the withdrawal of the battery, and we were moved around the hill on which our guns had been located to the right, parallel with and facing the railroad, thus placing the rear of the Wisconsin regiment. Here our position was of artillery leaving the field, with all possible speed, in the direction of Franklin. The cavalry, the other section of our battery, the Wisconsin, bravely repulsed the attack, depriving us of the possibility of escape, and of all hope of a successful resistance. As they disappeared, the enemy pressed us with renewed vigor, and they were retreating in distance or a disgraceful and disorderly flight. To our stubborn firmness against the greatest odds is due the successful repulse of the troops who had thus sought safety in flight. The 22d Wis. had just changed its position, forming a line parallel with us, and several of the men were seen upon the hillside, near the position just vacated by our battery. We were at once attacked in rear and left by dismounted cavalrymen in great numbers.

We were compelled to face this attacking force by the rear rank, and, as a consequence, only two or three companies of the 19th Mich. on the left were able to effectively return the fire. As the 22d Wis. moved forward, and nearer the crest of the ridge, the enemy's fire along the whole line of the Wisconsin troops was terrific, and although they were exposed to the enfilade fire from their batteries, the Wisconsin boys, with such assistance as could be rendered by their Michigan comrades, bravely repulsed the attack and compelled their foes to retire. The command given by the cool and courageous Col. Utley, of the 22d Wis., a moment before this attack upon our lines, became a pet word, and was repeated throughout the brigade for months afterwards. It was: "Look out, boys; get ready to shoot; the rebels are coming." And they were ready.

The 19th Mich. was then ordered across the railroad and to change front to the left. As this movement was begun, the Wisconsin troops were seen, and we found Armstrong's Brigade, which had charged the Indiana regiments, in our very midst. With bayonets fixed, we charged them to the stone fence at the foot of the hill, over which Jackson's men in their first charge had driven our Indiana comrades. At this fence Whitfield's Brigade was in line, and with desperate courage they stood our advance. In this unequal contest of one regiment against a whole brigade the fighting was more than hand-to-hand, it was a desperate individual duel, and the courage was many a

gent of my company sprang upon the stone wall, seized the Texans' brigade colors, bayoneted its bearer, and we retained possession until the close of the contest. Notwithstanding the Texans exhibited a superior courage and fought with a determination to destroy the Union colors, they could not withstand the impetuosity and the bayonets of their Wolverine foe, and they fled across the valley and joined their retreating comrades, only to reform and return, to be again and again driven from our front.

A Gallant Rebel. Here an incident illustrating personal courage and our admiration of it occurred. In the Wisconsin Brigade, an officer of Van Dorn's staff, well mounted, the last to retreat, stopped in his flight to protect with his horse and his sword a wounded soldier from our fire, and to assist him from the field. This act of courage elicited a cheer from many of our men, and as order to "Cease firing at that officer."

Our cavalry, dismounted, occupied a narrow strip of the left of the 19th Mich. The 124th Ohio was in the rear, guarding the ammunition-train, a mile away. By the time we had thus gotten into position, our battery opened upon the enemy, the firing was changed for nearly half an hour, with no apparent effect upon our side. I was at this time ordered to send a party to the stone fence at the depot, to our immediate front. As you will remember, the stalks as a rule were left standing, and they served as a partial cover for these men, who were directed to creep cautiously toward a group of mounted men on a knoll distant some 300 yards, and ascertain whether they were friends or foes. As this group of men were seen on a high knoll to our left, and by the aid of an old-fashioned 11-inch spy-

glass, the property of a private and apparently a rebel, we discovered the enemy there planting a battery, and soon a shell from it was directed at the four marksmen, who were by this time more than half way on their mission through the cornfield. It failed of its errand, and the quartet, "acelerando double-quick," retired, seeking safety with their own, real, reliable stone fence behind which we were in line.

A Daring Sharpshooter. At this moment a small puff of smoke was seen at the foot of the hill on which this battery had been planned, and a horse dashed down the hillside, and his rider falling from the saddle. One of our dismounted cavalrymen, a skilled and without orders, was at this along under cover of the woods to the foot of the hill until within range, selected his target, taking deadly aim at it, as reported, the person of Gen. Armstrong, the Adjutant-General. To avenge this act, the battery sent a hissing shell at the daring soldier. They then opened fire upon us, the first shell striking a rebel who was in the very midst of the men of Co. E, 9th Mich., killing them with drift. Fortunately it failed to explode. Our battery, on an elevation at our rear, returned the fire, and a number of shots were exchanged. The 19th Mich. was then ordered in column by division, close order, to lie down just under the guns of our battery, the firing the morning directly over and by far too near our heads to be enjoyable. We were in this position but a moment, when the rattle of musketry and the rebel yell away to our right assured us that our comrades of the 33d and 85th Ind. were desperately engaged.

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EXPLOSION OF THE MINE UNDER THE REBEL FORT AT VICKSBURG.

would be overlooked from the next point gained.

Capt. Hickenlooper's indefatigable miners, under the command of Lieut. Russell, were greatly elated by the complete success of their part of the work in the destruction of the fort, and with renewed energy set about digging a mine under the new fort which had loomed up across the path of Logan's Division.

While so engaged the engineers and working parties were busy along the whole 12 miles of line of investment in pushing forward the preparations for a general assault. Wherever ground could be gained by digging to make standing room for massed men it was done, and the approaches were everywhere widened so as to admit the rushing forward of columns of fours at the supreme moment. The crater of Fort Hill was armed with heavy siege guns to fire directly into the breach which would be made by the explosion of the projected mine, and the artillery was reinforced by a number of wooden Coehorn mortars.

Wooden Mortars.

As the siege progressed the Union soldiers became very expert in the science of engineering, and the manufacture of siege materials. Capt. Frederick I. Prime, the Chief Engineer of the Army, pays a deserved tribute to the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the men of the army, saying in his report: "The want of officers of Engineers already been referred to, there being at no time more than three or four engineers. Over a line so extended and ground so rough as that which surrounds Vicksburg, only a general supervision was possible, and this gave to the siege one of its peculiar characteristics; namely, that many times, at different places, the work that should be done, and the way it should be done, depended on officers, or even men, without either theoretical or practical knowledge of siege operations, and who had to rely upon their native good sense and ingenuity. Whether a battery was to be constructed by men who had never built one before, a sap-roller made by those who had never heard the name, or a ship's gun-carriage to be built, it was done, and after a few trials, was well done. But while stating the power of adaptation to circumstances and fertility of resources which our men possess in so high a degree, it must be recollected that these powers were shown at the expense of time, and while a relieving force was gathering in our rear. Officers and men had to learn to be engineers while the siege was going on."

The ingenuity of the men was particularly illustrated in the matter of land grenades. The rebel troops occupying higher ground had all the time a decided advantage in the use of this species of weapons, since all that was necessary for them to do was to light six or 12-pound shells and start them rolling down the bank. The distance was too great for the Union soldiers to throw them back by hand, and they were compelled to other devices. One of these was a springboard. A long plank would be weighted at one end and arranged so that it could be released by a trigger. When a lighted shell was placed on the end and tossed this up just high enough to fall down behind the enemy's works. Some of these springs were made with twisted ropes and hickory saplings. In some instances hickory saplings were used with a basket of wheat on the end to hold the shot.

The happy thought of some of the men of making a little cavity in a block of wood in which to hold two or three musket cartridges and give force enough

pounds of powder, and then firmly tamped with earth, timbers, etc. Every time the enemy fired a shell, a crater was ready for the explosion by the morning of July 1, but the time set for firing the fuse was 1:30, and again the whole long length of the work in the destruction of the fort, and with renewed energy set about digging a mine under the new fort which had loomed up across the path of Logan's Division.

While so engaged the engineers and working parties were busy along the whole 12 miles of line of investment in pushing forward the preparations for a general assault. Wherever ground could be gained by digging to make standing room for massed men it was done, and the approaches were everywhere widened so as to admit the rushing forward of columns of fours at the supreme moment. The crater of Fort Hill was armed with heavy siege guns to fire directly into the breach which would be made by the explosion of the projected mine, and the artillery was reinforced by a number of wooden Coehorn mortars.

The orders were, as before, to allow the firing to die down to complete silence, and then at the moment of the explosion open up with all the force of musketry and artillery. The hour set was awaited in tense silence by the assembled army. The fuses worked perfectly; the explosion raised an immense mass of earth, timber, guns and gun-carriages into the air, and threw some of the defenders of the work and some of those engaged in counter-mining clear over into the Union line. A crater was made about 20 feet deep and 50 feet in diameter, virtually destroying the fort. At that instant the artillery opened up in terrific volleys, and directly in front of the breach two nine-inch Dahlgren guns, a battery of field pieces and several of the wooden Coehorn mortars concentrated the most terrific fire upon the breach. This was accompanied by what the Confederate Engineer described as the deadliest fire of musketry he had ever known. Maj. S. H. Lockett, Pemberton's Chief Engineer, had anticipated the explosion, and was a few moments before the breach was made, and he rushed to prevent it by blowing up the Union mines. Six of the seven men with him were killed. He immediately rushed to the breach to do what he could to stop the counter-miners, and even when they tried to throw up an embankment with shovels from each side, but this was immediately swept away before the heavy fire. Then secured a temporary halt, and he was thrown in, to be swept away in their turn. The ground was too rough for an assault, and the Union soldiers contented themselves with keeping up a devastating fire. At last the enemy secured some protection by filling tent files and wagon covers with earth, and rolling them into the breach. In this way the enemy secured a temporary respite, though the Union artillery and musketry continued to play into the breach for 48 hours. During this time Capt. S. R. Tresilian, the Engineer of the Third Division, fired into the breach 102 six-pound shells and 366 12-pound, besides an unreported number of still heavier shells. The rebel loss was something over 100 men killed and wounded by the shells and the awful musketry fire.

As to the effect of this terrible fire upon the enemy we have the following report by Col. F. M. Cockrell, who commanded the First Brigade, Missouri Volunteers, and who was for many years after a Senator from Missouri. He says:

"On the evening of July 1 the enemy exploded a mine, charged with at least 2,000 pounds of powder, the crater making a fearful breach through a portion of the rebel works. Lieut. John T. Crenshaw and killing Lieut. John Roseberry and several privates of the 6th Mo., some of whom were blown high up into the air and buried in the wreck. Eight negroes and the overseer in charge working a counter-mine, were also killed. A large number of the 4th Mo. were blown up and thrown over the brow of the hill, and quite a number severely wounded.

the works on either side was made at imminent risk of life. Consequently the English him on full advantage of the truces that sometimes occurred for the purpose of burying the dead to get a survey of the ground between the works. Maj. S. H. Lockett, Pemberton's Chief Engineer, tells how Gen. Sherman prevented him from getting a much desired examination of the ground in his front:

"While well adapted to the purpose of this work a Federal orderly came up to me and said that Gen. Sherman wished to speak to me. Following the orderly, some 200 yards in front of our line, one of these came forward, introduced himself as Gen. Sherman, and said: 'I saw that you were an officer by your insignia of rank, and have asked you to meet me, to put into your hands some letters entrusted to me by Northern friends of some of your officers and men. I thought this would be a good opportunity to deliver this mail before it got too old.'"

To this I replied: 'General, it would have been very odd indeed if you had kept in until you brought it into Vicksburg, yourself.' "So you think, then," said the General, 'I am taking a slow march route.' "Well, rather," was the reply, 'when you have to travel by regular approaches, parallels, and zigzags.' "He said, 'that is a slow way of getting into a place, but it is a sure way, and I was determined to deliver those letters sooner or later.'"

The General then invited me to take a seat with him, and he laid out for me, and thus the rest of the Federal truce was spent in pleasant conversation. In the course of it the General remarked:

"You have an admirable position for defense here, and you have taken excellent advantage of the ground."

"Yes, General," I replied, 'but it is equally as well adapted to offensive operations, and your Engineers have not been slow to discover it.'"

"To this Gen. Sherman assented. Internationally or not, his civility certainly prevented me from seeing many points in our front that I as Chief Engineer was very anxious to examine."


Despite the vigorous defense which the Union troops encountered there was no doubt that a large portion of the garrison was at the point of open mutiny. They were strongly dissatisfied with the management of the defense, and the steady advance of the Union works, which they could not arrest, was a very depressing effect upon them. They saw that their case was hopeless unless something entirely unexpected happened. All the blooded and labor of no avail to stop the slow, deadly advance of the Union army, making it only a question of time when they would have to succumb. For a long time they had been buoyed up with stories of relief from Kirby Smith on the west side of the river, and Joe Johnston on the east, but the most had been made of Jefferson Davis's promise to save the city at whatever cost. After Milliken's Bend there was no longer the slightest hope from Kirby Smith and Dick Taylor, and that of relief from Johnston was rapidly dying the death of despair. Pemberton tried to reanimate them with preparations to escape across the Mississippi River, and actually did much work in tearing down frame houses in Vicksburg and making small flatboats from the material thus obtained. At the time of the surrender there were a large number of these completed and very much in view. Deserters and others had fully informed Gen. Grant of the plan. Commodore Purke was none the less took care

The question naturally occurs whether these messages of which Maj. Lockett speaks were not intended to be translated. For some time, which had been instructing his men to mingle with the Confederates in the truces which occurred every night and spread the field of battle, the enemy was in a position to take place, to parole his prisoners and let them go home. There was a shrewd policy in this. The garrison was largely made up of men from Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee and Kentucky, many of whom had grown tired of the war and were anxious to return to their homes, where they were in the midst of the Union. Once there and out of reach of the Confederate conscripting officers, they would remain until the end of the war and take no further part in the struggle.

Flags of Truce. While the Union soldiers were pushing forward their mines and approaches with the greatest activity in anticipation of a general assault, which was understood to be set for July 6, white flags suddenly appeared at the salient points about 10 o'clock in the forenoon of July 3.

Union artists and infantrymen at once ceased their fire and looked with eager eyes to see what would follow. Soon two officers were seen approaching our lines under a large white flag. These proved to be Maj.-Gen. John S. Bowen, who commanded one of Pemberton's Divisions, and Col. Montgomery, Aid-de-Camp to Pemberton, and who bore the following letter:

"Headquarters, Vicksburg, Miss., July 3, 1863. "Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding United States Forces, Vicksburg. "General: I have the honor to propose to you an armistice for several hours, with a view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners to meet a like number, to be named by yourself, at such place and hour today as you may find convenient. "I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood which must ensue, feeling myself able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. "This communication will be handed you under flag of truce by Maj.-Gen. J. S. Bowen. "Very respectfully, your obedient servant. "C. Pemberton, Lieutenant-General. (Continued on page six.)



"AN OFFICER OF VAN DORN'S STAFF, THE LAST TO RETREAT, STOPPED TO ASSIST A WOUNDED SOLDIER FROM THE FIELD."